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ABSTRACT 
In his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume offers an elaborate account of the origins of 
property and suggests modesty has a similar origin. In this paper, I draw on Hume’s discussions of 
modesty and property to extract his account of the origin of modesty. Modesty and property are 
ultimately regulated by pride and selfishness according to Hume. I argue that these choices of 
passions, as the grounds of their related virtues, express an intentionally irreligious and anti-Christian 
approach. Furthermore, I argue that reading Hume in the context of irreligion not only helps 
understand his own theory, but also explains his different relationships to Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson. I conclude that readers of Hume must consider his irreligious motives alongside his 
skeptical and naturalistic methods if they are to understand him in a historically accurate way, and 
make sense of how he approaches his project in the Treatise. 
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1 
1 INTRODUCTION  
 
 
The gay naturally associate themselves with 
 the gay, and the amorous with the amorous: 
 But the proud never can endure the proud  
-David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 
 
Some few were Learn’d and Eloquent, 
But thousands Hot and Ignorant: 
Yet all pass’d Muster that could hide 
Their Sloth, Lust, Avarice and Pride; 
For which they were as fam’d as Tailors 
For Cabbage, or for Brandy Sailors 
-Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees 
 
 
These two quotations represent a trend that developed in moral and political philosophy 
leading up to the eighteenth century. The quotation from Hume illustrates the tensions arising from 
the social intermingling of human passions, while Mandeville’s verses express the insight that social 
mechanisms emerge to regulate those passions. Thinkers interested in the social regulation of the 
passions understood along with Newton that forces are stopped only by opposing forces of a similar 
kind, and along with Spinoza that “an affect can neither be taken away nor restrained except through 
an opposite and stronger affect” (Spinoza, Part IV Prop. 7). Motivated by these insights, many 
thinkers rejected the metaphor of a war between reason and passion, or between divinity and nature, 
preferring to see the study of morals as an investigation into a civil war of passion against passion. 
Winning this war came to be seen as the key to progress, and Albert Hirschman has noted: “the idea 
of engineering social progress by cleverly setting up one passion to fight another became a fairly 
common intellectual pastime in the course of the eighteenth century” (Hirschman, 26).  
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Within this context, Hume wrote the Treatise of Human Nature, in which he engages with 
many figures who were involved in the debate over the passions. Consequently, the passions have a 
fundamental role in Hume’s theory of mind and his account of ethics. A salient feature of Hume’s 
account of the civil war amongst the passions is that he attributes similar roles to selfishness and 
pride in social and moral development. In Book III of the Treatise Hume explains, “In like manner… 
as we establish the laws of nature, in order to secure property in society, and prevent the opposition 
of self-interest; we establish the rules of good-breeding, in order to prevent the opposition of men’s 
pride, and render conversation agreeable and inoffensive” (T 3.3.2.10). Here Hume indicates a 
symmetry in how the institutions regulating selfishness and those regulating pride develop; however, 
he never explains the way norms regulating pride develop as systematically as he does the norms 
regulating selfishness. In this essay, I outline Hume’s position, flesh out the account of modesty and 
the rules of good-breeding that he only gestures to, and draw out a further exegetical insight that 
comes from understanding Hume’s position and its relation to the Christian tradition.  
In particular, Hume argues that respect for property is grounded in selfishness and modesty 
is grounded in pride, giving ethically central roles to two famously sinful passions. This paper 
outlines and contextualizes the irreligious aspects of Hume’s arguments about selfishness and pride. 
By ‘irreligion’ I mean an active hostility towards religious dogma, organized religion, and Christianity 
in particular. My vocabulary and my position both draw on, and reinforce, Paul Russell’s argument 
in The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion that “the irreligious interpretation 
provides a fundamentally different account of… Hume’s aims and intentions in the Treatise and 
thereby alters our understanding of the significance of this work” (Russell, Riddle of Hume’s Treatise, 
viii).  The term ‘irreligion’ is more appropriate in this context than related and competing terms such 
as ‘atheist’ or ‘anti-Christian.’ While my focus on Hume here looks at his specifically anti-Christian 
arguments, those arguments are bound up with a number of instances where Hume criticizes 
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organized religion in general, which are important to appreciate. There are also problems with the 
term ‘atheist’ because Hume’s attitude towards theism is more equivocal than his attitude towards 
religion (see Russell, Riddle of Hume’s Treatise, 284). Attempts to explain Hume’s anti-religious 
arguments as skeptically motivated fail to capture his hostility towards religion in general, and 
Christianity in particular. Hume was also, notably, responding to a specific version of Christianity 
represented most clearly by Samuel Clarke, that dominated the intellectual landscape of his day. 
Each general label for Hume’s argumentative stance is too monolithic, much like the umbrella 
descriptions of Hume as a ‘naturalist’ or a ‘skeptic.’ That said, the irreligious dimension of Hume’s 
work demands integration into a historically conscious reading of it, alongside considerations of his 
naturalism and his skepticism. Finding Hume’s place between these various general philosophical 
poles allows us to better understand the nuances of his approach. 
Ultimately, I argue that Hume’s irreligion is fundamental to understanding the account he 
provides of the passions and morality, and is integral to understanding the Treatise as a whole. I 
extend Russell’s argument to Hume’s moral theory, which Russell only covers in a single chapter of 
his book. Extending this reading of Hume through his moral theory promises to be fruitful since 
moral and social theory were of such clear importance to Christian thinkers of the day, making them 
prime targets for irreligious writers. Hume leaves the reader a number of clues in the Treatise to 
discern the religiously subversive aspects of his position. Hume’s arguments that respect for 
property is grounded in selfishness and that modesty is grounded in pride are two such clues, both 
giving unsavory roles to historically sinful passions. Early readers of the Treatise were keenly aware of 
the anti-Christian aspects of Hume’s arguments. The structural and textual clues Hume leaves, taken 
alongside his reception as ‘atheistic,’ provide support for the project of reading the Treatise as bound 
up with the religious debates of the day. This new reading of Hume illuminates differences between 
Hume, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson, that have been obscured by previous readings. Without the 
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addition of the dimension of religion, Hume’s tenuous intellectual relationship with Hutcheson, and 
his more congenial one with Shaftesbury, both remain enigmatic. Distinguishing the different 
thinkers’ theistic, naturalistic, and irreligious approaches to moral sense theory enriches our 
discussion of sentimentalism, stopping sentimentalists from being misconstrued as a homogenous 
group of thinkers. At the same time, the irreligious reading of Hume’s work illuminates the broader 
role of secularism and irreligion in the development of modern ethics. 
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2 JUSTICE, PROPERTY, AND SELFISHNESS 
 
Selfishness, self-love, and self-interest played important roles in the development of ethics 
and Christian thought, and property rights have historically been at the heart of British moral 
philosophy. At least since Locke, the association between justice, one of the four cardinal virtues, 
and private property has been salient in British moral philosophy. For Locke, the “related concepts 
of justice and of property in a broad sense… have an obvious place in God’s plans for us” 
(Schneewind, 217). Discussions of property and selfishness are also bound up in different views 
about moral motivation. Paul Russell points out that the debate about “human morality and the 
motivations lying behind it trades in a series of widely discussed and debated paradoxes” and notes 
that the “most notorious of these is that virtue and benevolence are in fact motivated by a desire for 
praise and flattery” (Russell, Riddle of Hume’s Treatise, 246). The idea that certain virtues could be 
grounded in forms of selfishness or self-love was a controversial idea, but one that nonetheless 
gained traction since Mandeville raised it in criticizing Shaftesbury. Similar debates about the 
selfishness or philanthropy of people’s motives extended to discussions of property and justice. 
Many thinkers, such as Shaftesbury, tried to distance justice from selfish motives, perhaps seeing it 
as dialectically unsavory to ground one of the cardinal virtues in economic self-interest, which the 
Christian tradition held to be the “root of all kinds of evil” (The New Oxford Bible, 1 Timothy 6:10). 
Hume’s approach to these debates is to come up with a general psychological theory that he 
can apply to explain norms like those regulating property. According to Hume, moral norms emerge 
from social convention rooted in human psychology, or “passions,” which also provide the 
motivation to act. Hume’s theory of norms bottoms out in facts about human psychology and 
convention, eschewing any attempt to ground moral norms in reason. Hume’s psychological bent is 
evident in his claim that “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never 
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pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (T 2.3.3.4). So, when Hume speaks of 
property laws as “laws of nature” he does so with an eye to their origins. Annette Baier captures this 
well, explaining that in the Treatise, Hume treats us as “an inventive species, whose cultural 
inventions, while they are real novelties, owe much to our non-self-invented nature” (Baier, 148). 
On Hume’s view, justice is artificial, but artifice is natural. 
Applying his general method, Hume aims to explain the development of justice, and the 
“laws of nature,” in terms of relatively simple and uncontroversial aspects of human psychology. 
Hume sees selfishness as a feature of humans’ “natural temper” (T 3.2.2.5) and argues that it is only 
from “the selfishness and confin’d generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has 
made for his wants, that justice derives its origin” (T 3.2.2.18). Here and elsewhere, Hume ties 
together scarcity, selfish desire, and sympathy, seeing them as interrelated factors motivating and 
facilitating the establishment of property laws. In putting forth his account, Hume faces the 
challenge of figuring out what motivates people to moderate their selfishness in the face of scarcity, 
rather than steal when it suits them. 
One might respond to this challenge by opposing selfishness to reason or a typically positive 
passion such as benevolence; such approaches would be traditional, pitting reason against passion, 
or combatting typically vicious passions with typically virtuous ones. Hume rejects such traditional 
approaches because he believes that a passion can only be controlled by an equally robust and 
opposed passion (T 2.1.2.3). The problem Hume faces is that it is not clear what passion has enough 
oppositional force to counteract selfishness; his solution to the problem is an ingenious and now 
familiar one: 
‘Tis certain, that no affection of the human mind has both a sufficient force, and a proper 
direction to… render men fit members of society, by making them abstain from the 
possessions of others…. There is no passion, therefore, capable of controlling the interested 
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affection, but the very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction. Now this alteration 
must necessarily take place upon the least reflection; since ‘tis evident, that the passion is 
much better satisfy’d by its restraint, than by its liberty, and that by preserving society, we 
make much greater advances in the acquiring possessions, than by running into the solitary 
and forlorn condition. (T 3.2.2.13) 
According to Hume, selfishness is divided against itself, rather than being enmeshed in a battle 
against reason or any more typically virtuous passion. The selfish individual must choose between 
satisfying her short or long term desires, the former more easily and immediately achievable and the 
latter more socially mediated but with a far greater return. Because the long term desires stemming 
from the selfish passion are “better satisfy’d by… restraint than liberty,” the passion ultimately 
functions as its own restraint (once the actors involved have become appropriately behaviorally 
conditioned). Consequently, on this account, a vice such as selfishness is the source of the very 
virtues that regulate it. Although Hume doesn’t use this language, it seems that the consequences of 
the passions are realized over the course of history, constrained by both scarcity and society until 
indulgence is (hopefully) borne out of restraint. The passage above captures the broader features of 
the development of property norms but neglects certain finer details.  
Hume does not attribute the ability to make long-term utilitarian calculations to the involved 
agents. The account Hume provides is subtler, focusing on gradual developments over time by way 
of behavioral conditioning. This subtlety is illustrated in the metaphor he uses of two rowers on a 
boat: 
Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho’ they have 
never given promises to each other. Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the 
less deriv’d from human conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow 
progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it.  
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(T 3.2.2.10) 
In this masterful example, each time a rower ceases to row she experiences the negative 
consequences and “repeated experience of the inconvenience of transgressing” the implicit norm 
and is thereby motivated to promote the increasing uniformity of the convention. Likewise, one 
could imagine two families of humans gradually and similarly developing a convention regarding 
property; each family, motivated by its selfishness, would at first steal from the other family 
whenever the opportunity arose. The other family would retaliate or reciprocate the theft, in turn, 
going against the first family’s interests, which motivated the original case of theft. As more 
“repeated experiences of the inconvenience of transgressing” the implicit property norm accrue, the 
laws of justice take shape and begin to bind the families to the norm. It’s important to realize that 
while it is possible to talk about this development in terms of implicit norms being made explicit, 
one of Hume’s points is that the implicit norms themselves arise out of entirely non-normative 
transactions. This development is gradual and unintentional, bearing a closer analogy to common 
law than contract law in that it develops implicitly in various practices. Furthermore, the features of 
human psychology motivating this development are primarily sentient, rather than sapient, based in 
pleasure, pain, and passion, more than reason. 
People’s initiation into the convention of respecting property is an important part of Hume’s 
story. Even if adhering to certain social conventions helps one reap greater rewards, what motivates 
one to participate in the convention or learn of its benefits in the first place? Hume acknowledges of 
humans that “‘tis impossible, in their wild uncultivated state, that by study and reflection alone, they 
shou’d ever be able to attain this knowledge,” but then he reassuringly explains, “Most fortunately, 
therefore, there is conjoin’d to those necessities, whose remedies are remote and obscure, another 
necessity, which having a present and more obvious remedy, may justly be regarded as the first and 
original principle of human society. This necessity is no other than that natural appetite betwixt the 
9 
sexes” (T 3.2.2.4). Hume believes that initiation into a family provides individuals with their first 
experience of the utility of passionate self-regulation in a social context and such initiation results 
naturally from the simple and uncontroversial instinct for sexual attraction. By basing convention in 
the universal relation of kinship, and making its initial motivation the basic and non-controversial 
sex instinct, Hume avoids attributing any complex process of calculation to the members of the 
imagined primitive society; furthermore, this extends Hume’s project of tracing the origins of social 
practice to sentience rather than sapience. 
It may seem here that Hume is grounding all morality in self-interest, but he sees another key 
factor playing into moral practice. For Hume, sympathy is one of the most fundamental sources of 
moral approbation. He explains that although selfishness motivates the development of social 
institutions, it is sympathy that leads to the higher moral pleasures and pains, which motivate senses 
of obligation: 
To the imposition then, and observance of these rules… they are at first mov’d only by a 
regard to interest. But when society... encreas’d to a tribe or nation, this interest is more 
remote.... The general rule reaches beyond those instances, from which it arose.... Thus self-
interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: But a sympathy with public 
interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue. (T 3.2.2.24) 
Members of society act like mirrors, reflecting and intensifying prevailing sentiments, which spread 
ever wider (T 2.2.5.21). Norms develop as people pursue pleasure and avoid pain, and those norms 
become recognized by members of society; sympathy ultimately leads me to care about the 
protection of others by the emergent laws, regardless of the benefits I stand to gain. Hume 
demystifies (or at least attempts to demystify) people’s sense of obligation by grounding morality in 
social practice. Hume further grounds social practice in individual experience, holding that “without 
the appropriate feelings there would be no such things as moral judgments” and that “our moral 
10 
judgments, like our causal judgments, are ‘projections’” (Stroud, 184-185). On Hume’s account, 
“without the appropriate feelings there would be no such things as moral judgments” and without 
the establishment of the rules of justice “there are no rights, duties, or obligations at all” (Stroud, 
184 & 203); it is only after the establishment of justice, motivated by selfishness, that sympathy, 
solidarity, and society (in the proper sense of the word) are possible. But in the end, it is sympathy 
that specifically grounds those peculiar moral obligations we feel towards one another and, for us, 
sympathy is as real as any factor motivating us to act. 
Stepping back one can see how these emergent norms function like a kind of secularized 
providence; Hume writes, “as the self-love of one person is naturally contrary to that of another, 
these several interested passions are oblig’d to adjust themselves after such a manner as to concur in 
some system of conduct and behaviour. This system, therefore, comprehending the interest of each 
individual, is of course advantageous to the public; tho’ it be not intended for that purpose by the 
inventors” (T 3.2.6.6). Passages like these make Hume’s account appear more as a characterization 
of the expression of passion in society than of the development of rational social institutions. The 
characteristics of property laws, outlined above, namely, the self-regulation of selfishness, the 
psychological motivation for justice, the gradual emergence of institutions, and the initiation into 
convention, are essential for understanding the analogy between norms governing property and 
those governing modesty. It is important to realize that the rules of justice emerge gradually out of 
social interactions that incentivize self-interest’s self-regulation. This ultimately means that, through 
self-regulation, the passion once seen to be the “root of all kinds of evil” is now characterized as the 
most fundamental motivation people have to adopt actions in line with the cardinal virtue of justice. 
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3 VIRTUE, MODESTY, AND PRIDE 
 
 If modesty is developmentally analogous to private property then it will be grounded in the 
passion it regulates, namely pride; this makes sense because pride is to the rules of good breeding as 
selfishness is to the laws of nature or property. If this feature of the analogy holds, it will further 
support the view that Hume attempts an irreligious polemic against the Christian tradition, a 
tradition that condemns pride, construing it as the greatest of all sins and the passion that lead to 
Lucifer’s rebellion. Saying that pride, the greatest of the seven deadly sins, serves as the underlying 
motivation for modesty is a starkly irreligious move. It is unlikely that Hume would have been 
unaware of the irreligious connotations of his account. 
We cannot understand Hume’s account of the “rules of good breeding” and modesty 
without first understanding his treatment of pride because, as in the case of selfishness, pride 
ultimately grounds the virtue that regulates it. In the Treatise, Hume provides a complex account of 
pride that considers it in a variety of contexts. In Book II, Hume considers the purely psychological 
features of pride. In that section his conception of pride is broad, and he opens it by explaining that 
the status of pride as one of the “simple and uniform impressions” precludes it from being given a 
“just definition” (T 2.1.2.1); nonetheless one can describe features of pride and stipulate a broad 
definition of it as a pleasant, self-directed, passion (T 2.1.2.2). While the object of pride is the self, 
the cause of pride can focus on a “vast variety of subjects” including, amongst other things: “wit, 
good-sense, learning, courage…. beauty, strength, agility, good mien, address in dancing…. Our 
country, family, children, relations, riches, house, gardens, horses, dogs,” etc. (T 2.1.2.5). The 
simplicity of Hume’s description of pride is what allows him to apply it to such a wide variety of 
cases. When Hume considers this simple psychological conception of pride in a social context, he 
makes a number of interesting observations about its role in moral practice. 
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In Book III of the Treatise, Hume considers the complex manifestations of pride in the 
context of morality, extending his treatment of pride from its psychological role to its societal one. 
Hume sees pride as serving important purposes in moral practice, recognizing that it “capacitates us 
for business, and, at the same time, gives us an immediate satisfaction,” but he goes on to point out 
that pride sometimes “goes beyond its just bounds” and becomes a source of discord (T 3.3.2.14). A 
number of factors determine the moral status of an expression, or manifestation, of pride. First, 
there are the social and individual forms of pleasure or pain caused by the manifestation of pride. 
Second, there is the relationship between the person manifesting pride and the person observing and 
evaluating that manifestation.1 In certain situations the evaluator will sympathize with the proud 
individual, causing her to experience a pleasant sensation similar to that experienced by the subject 
(T 3.3.2.3); an example of this is when a parent feels pride for the accomplishments of her child. On 
the other hand, in some situations the evaluator compares (or more accurately, contrasts) herself 
with the proud individual and feels the painful twinge of humility (T 3.3.2.5). Third, Hume considers 
people’s ability to discriminate between well and poorly justified expressions of pride. The problem 
of justification stems from the epistemic constraints on individuals’ ability to evaluate their own 
expressions of pride; this complexity impacts the moral practices that develop to regulate pride. 
Manifestations of pride are grounded in a series of beliefs and attitudes bound up in a 
complex causal process; thus, one’s understanding of these various factors is limited in many cases. 
This complexity in grounds allows for the possibility that the “grounds may be open to criticism: the 
relevant belief may be false or unreasonable, or the general attitude may be based in turn on 
unwarranted beliefs, or an injudicious weighing of considerations…. Pride is open to criticism, then, 
but the criticism must concern the whole constellation of belief and attitude that is its direct source” 
                                                 
1 Hume’s account of these dynamics is vague, but this vagueness is unproblematic if one considers 
his account a general one that serves as a basis for further inquiry. 
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(Davidson, 753); for example, someone may be proud of his or her wealth, but this pride may be 
dampened (or even eradicated) if it is pointed out that the wealth was inherited rather than earned. 
Hume notes that when someone manifests pride that is “ill-grounded,” others will be more critical 
of them; but the grounds of pride are complex and, “No one can well distinguish in himself betwixt 
the vice and virtue, or be certain, that his esteem of his own merit is well-founded,” and 
consequently “all direct expressions of this passion are condemn’d” (T 3.3.2.10). The epistemic 
limitations to evaluating one’s own pride, paired with the universal propensity people have to feel 
proud of themselves, leads to a general treatment of each other’s expressions of pride as unjustified 
and therefore vicious. In other words, the propensity people have towards self-bias motivates a 
general suspicion regarding self-directed approbation, which leads to a culture that values modesty. 
This point is important, because Hume uses it both to explain how pride could self-regulate and to 
explain why pride is demonized in the first place, furthering his project of psychologically explaining 
moral practices. It is important to realize that the various psychological and social factors that Hume 
identifies will often be in tension with each other and that ethical practices will function as means to 
equilibrium among the different pains and pleasures associated with the different factors. 
The rules of good breeding are one such means to emotional equilibrium. Just as the “laws 
of nature” are best understood through their origin in selfishness, so too are the rules of good 
breeding best understood in terms of their origins in pride. Turning back to the quotation guiding 
this paper, Hume writes, “In like manner, therefore, as we establish the laws of nature, in order to 
secure property in society, and prevent the opposition of self-interest; we establish the rules of good-
breeding, in order to prevent the opposition of men’s pride, and render conversation agreeable and 
inoffensive” (T 3.3.2.10). The two points of analogy that Hume states are the regulation of opposing 
passions and the protection of various conventions; but the analogy runs deeper than Hume makes 
clear, extending beyond the functions and establishment, and into the developmental structure of 
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both sets of norms. Hume never provides the same in-depth account of the development of the 
“rules of good breeding” as he does for the “laws of nature” but he provides a number of remarks 
that can be used alongside various passages in the latter account to reconstruct his position on the 
origins of modesty. 
As in other cases, Hume explores the operations of pride in various settings and contexts, 
always with an eye to pain and pleasure. This approach makes sense because Hume sees the rules of 
good breeding as artificial like justice, seeing both sets of norms as “mere human contrivances for 
the interest of society” (T 3.3.1.9). He starts out by explaining that pride has, at different times, both 
virtuous and vicious qualities determined by its surrounding circumstances: 
The merit of pride or self-esteem is deriv’d from two circumstances, viz. its utility and its 
agreeableness to ourselves; by which it capacitates us for business, and, at the same time, 
gives us an immediate satisfaction. When it goes beyond its just bounds, it loses the first 
advantage, and even becomes prejudicial. (T 3.3.2.14) 
So, pride can be seen both as a source of personal feelings of agreeableness and as a means to 
effective business dealings. This clarifies that Hume divides pride, like selfishness, into individually 
and socially evaluative categories that can reinforce and oppose each other in various contexts; this 
similarity is one of those Hume suggests. Our interactions in society require that we moderate our 
pride to avoid causing offense and disagreement, and this moderation requires some force or 
motivation behind it. This account of pride elucidates a position held by Hume in both cases; 
namely, that a given passion is rarely virtuous or vicious in itself, and that its moral status is largely 
situational. With selfishness Hume rejected the methods of pitting reason against passion, and 
pitting opposed passions against each other, favoring an account of a passion’s battle against itself 
instead. With respect to pride, it can be asked: which of the methods does Hume employ here? 
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In what he describes as a ‘trite observation,’ Hume gives a possible answer to the question of 
what motivates the regulation of pride: 
‘Tis a trite observation in philosophy... that ‘tis our own pride, which makes us so much 
displeas’d with the pride of other people; and that vanity becomes insupportable to us 
merely because we are vain…. As we are, all of us, proud in some degree, pride is universally 
blam’d and condemn’d by all mankind. (T 3.3.2.7) 
Just as selfishness regulates itself, for the sake of the goods acquirable through society and 
protection by norms concerning property, so too does pride motivate the norms regulating itself; 
this is another relevant similarity between the two accounts. This makes sense given the universal 
propensity towards both passions that Hume attributes to human beings. The force and universality 
of pride and selfishness make them the best candidates for motivating their own regulation, or so 
Hume argues. Peoples’ desire for others to act modestly, and conceal their pride, stems from their 
own feelings of pride, and many desires wouldn’t draw motivational force without the activity of 
that passion. Humans naturally want to express their pride, but “were we always to give vent to our 
[proud] sentiments... we shou’d mutually cause the greatest indignation in each other” thereby 
destroying the socially and individually beneficial aspects of pride and hurting our own pride in the 
process (T 3.3.2.10). This motivates the realization that “if we observe these rules [of good breeding 
and modest composure] in our conduct, men will have more indulgence for our secret sentiments, 
when we discover them in an oblique manner” (T 3.3.2.10).  
Consider an example: Imagine two colleagues, Andy and Maria, of similarly high merit. Both 
Andy and Maria believe themselves to be good at their jobs and take pride in that. Both of them also 
realize that their self-evaluation could be wrong, understanding that people have a bias in favor of 
themselves. As a result, both of them avoid robust displays of pride, instead expressing modesty. If 
Andy or Maria expresses pride directly, the other will likely see grounds for undermining that pride 
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or at least be bothered that someone would not constrain their expressions of pride in the face of 
general self-oriented bias. If Andy expresses proud self-approbation, then Maria will be lead to 
conclude (by means of self-comparison) that the expression is unwarranted; this will lead Maria to 
react negatively, hurting Andy’s pride. On the other hand, if Andy presents himself modestly, and 
reveals his talents obliquely, then Maria will likely sympathize with him and enjoy his talents without 
considering their display an act of vanity. So one’s pride is best expressed and satisfied through 
modesty. If people could be blatantly self-congratulatory, then many would. People refrain from 
displaying pride because it often does hurt their pride to express it, just as people might lose their 
property if they let their selfishness motivate them to steal and undermine norms of property.  
While this example depicts Andy and Maria making rational calculations, their reason is only 
functioning instrumentally, as a slave to the proud passion motivating them. Ultimately it is pride 
that prompts the emergence of the norm, and provides the motivational force necessary to put it 
into practice, and reason merely makes the cost-benefit analysis to determine the best course of 
action. Important for our analogy is the fact that Andy and Maria only follow this norm, and make 
this analysis, because of a long history of behavioral conditioning to it. If we are imagining early 
humans instituting the norms, they would have been more driven by trial and error than by 
calculation. In either event, as the rules of good breeding emerge and ossify, the “repeated 
experience of the inconveniences of transgressing” them motivates their adoption. One is led to act 
modestly as a means of appeasing one’s pride. But as in the case of selfishness, norms that begin as a 
series of self-interested strategies soon decouple from their motivational origins and, by way of 
sympathy, take on a life of their own. 
 The only part of the analogy not covered thus far is the initiation into the conventions that 
allow one to become aware of the benefits of the rules of good breeding. This is in some respects 
the most straightforward similarity between the two sets of norms simply because it is likely identical 
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in both cases. The “appetite betwixt’ the sexes” initiates one into a social setting in which all artificial 
conventions naturally emerge and one need not appeal to more causes of initiation than one must. 
The sexual appetite leads individuals from solitude to society, introducing the selfish to the selfish 
and the proud to the proud, bringing with socialization the necessity for norms governing human 
passions and interests so that they do not give rise to conflict and instability. Through adaptation 
and adjustment, the norms governing modesty gradually emerge, and pride begins to cloak itself in 
modesty. 
This account of the rules of good breeding mirrors that of the origins of property, as Hume 
claims it does: pride is to modesty as selfishness is to respect for property, pride and selfishness 
being the passions that ground the very norms governing them. Both are motivated by people’s 
gradual and unconscious discovery that their passions will be better satisfied through restraint. In the 
case of good breeding, transgressions are met with indignation and scorn, but modesty and humility 
are met with praise and exaltation. Regarding property, transgressions of the emergent norm lead to 
counter-transgressions from others who steal in retaliation, while respect for the norm results in 
economic stability. In both cases, the passions being regulated have both positive and negative roles 
to play. Both sets of norms emerge in social settings that people are driven into by their sexual 
instinct, and this social setting motivates the establishment of families or tribes. The entire process is 
driven by a number of features of human sentience: (1) sexual desire, (2) selfishness and greed, (3) 
pride and love of praise, and (4) the pursuit of pleasure. The role of reason in both cases is minor 
and primarily instrumental. This clarifies the many ways in which the two sets of norms develop and 
function “in a like manner” with respect to their origins, purposes, and efficient causes. 
Furthermore, and relevant to my broader point about irreligion, both sets of norms are grounded in 
passions historically demonized by the Christian tradition. 
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4 EXEGESIS AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
Both justice and modesty, as Hume describes them, bear some interestingly vicious features. 
Interpreters of Hume often neglect the irreligious dimensions of his work. Paul Russell points out 
that interpretations of the Treatise almost unilaterally are presented within the context of a battle 
between rationalist, naturalist, and skeptical positions. Russell, who makes the case I am elaborating 
upon, argues that “the issue of religion adds a dimension of depth that is absent in the original three-
cornered framework” (Russell, Riddle of Hume’s Treatise, 247). Interpreting the Treatise as an irreligious 
polemic will help us understand it better both historically and internally. Hume’s irreligious choice of 
passions is not coincidental, both supporting and being supported by the broader irreligious reading. 
These two families of exegetical benefits can be seen when one considers Hume’s rich historical 
context. 
Hume’s position not only stands in stark contrast to the rationalism of thinkers like Samuel 
Clarke, for instance, but also to their religiosity. Contrary to the Christian tradition, which holds that 
one should “Do nothing from selfish ambition or conceit” (The New Oxford Bible, Philippians 2:3-4) 
and that “where there is envy and selfish ambition, there will also be disorder and wickedness of 
every kind” (The New Oxford Bible, James 3:16), Hume argues that selfish ambition and vain conceit 
are at the very heart of order and moral practice.2 In fact, pride and selfishness are included in both of 
the often confused lists of cardinal and deadly sins, and have been central to them since their 
appearance around roughly 100 B.C. (Bloomfield, 44). In the history of the cardinal sins pride and 
selfishness (avarice, cupidity, etc.) are the two that regularly are seen to be foundational, or “root,” 
                                                 
2 In Jaqueline Taylor’s Deadly Vices, she opens the section on pride by noting Hume’s curious 
inclusion of pride in his list of virtues as an exception to the tradition. 
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sins (Bloomfield, 88). The struggle for priority between the two eventually calms when pride 
assumes dominance as time goes on (Bloomfield, 75, 106, 110, & 183). In England, literary 
treatments of the cardinal sins placed pride at their heart since before 1200 (Bloomfield, 108-109). 
John Wycliffe continued the exploration of the cardinal sins; writing in the 1300s, he saw pride as 
the greatest of the sins (Bloomfield, 188). In the 1400s, in the religious encyclopedia Jacob’s Well, 
pride was still held to be the “root of all sins” (Bloomfield, 222-223). Even up through Milton, 
whom Hume describes as too heavily “occupied in the great disputes of Religion, Politics, and 
Philosophy” (Hume, Moral Philosophy, 324), saw pride as fundamental; in Paradise Lost, Milton argues 
that the first cause of sin was the devil’s “Pride” which “cast him out from Heaven, with all his host 
Of Rebel Angels, by whose aid aspiring To set himself in glory above his peers, He trusted to have 
equaled the most high, If he opposed; and with ambitious aim Against the throne and monarchy of 
God Raised impious war in Heav’n and battle proud With vain attempt” (ln 37-44). So in the 
Christian tradition as a whole, and its manifestations in England, pride and selfishness stand out as 
some of the most demonized and vicious passions, with pride being widely acknowledged as the 
greatest of all sins.  
 In order to understand Hume’s theory in its context, highlighting the dimension of irreligion 
that pervades it is integral. Hume’s moral theory, and the Treatise as a whole, is best understood 
within the context of a debate set in motion by Thomas Hobbes. In his Leviathan and elsewhere 
Hobbes presents a thoroughly materialistic and anti-rationalist account of human nature and ethics 
(Leviathan 1:6:7 & 1:8:16). One of the most virulent critics of Hobbes’ account was the rationalist 
Christian thinker Samuel Clarke. In his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, Clarke argues 
that there are eternal and immutable moral obligations. He saw morals as accessed by way of reason 
and went so far as to claim that “the true ground and foundation of all eternal moral obligations is... 
[the ability of reasons to] determine the will of all... intelligent beings” (Clarke, 89-90). He also sees 
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moral obligations as intrinsically motivational once discerned, saying that “intelligence... wholly 
separate from any power of will and choice” is “in respect of any excellency and perfection, or 
indeed to any common sense, is the very same thing as no intelligence at all” (Clarke, 38). For Clarke 
moral motivations are rationally discovered and categorically motivating; a position which Clarke 
explicitly notes is “directly contradictory to Mr. Hobbes’s” (Clarke in Raphael 228). There were, 
however, a number of neo-Hobbists and naturalists who presented alternatives to Clarke’s 
rationalism, and who were influential in Hume’s development. 
One alternative to Clarke’s rationalism was the naturalistic moral sense theory espoused by 
Anthony Cooper III, the Earl of Shaftesbury, and developed by Francis Hutcheson. Shaftesbury 
provided a thoroughly naturalistic account, according to which the “affection of a creature towards 
the good of the species or common nature, is as proper and natural to him, as it is to any organ, part 
or member of an animal body, or mere vegetable, to work its known course, and regular way of 
growth” (Shaftesbury, 54). Humans are motivated to act morally by a “reflected Sense” that 
evaluates the actions and affections of others (Shaftesbury, 45). Shaftesbury rejects rationalism, 
grounding morality in human sentience rather than sapience. Despite his anti-rationalist views, 
Shaftesbury also rejects Hobbist egoism by making the species (rather than the individual) the 
domain in relation to which moral rules are determined. Paul Russell has argued that it is because of 
these very “anti-Hobbist features of Shaftesbury’s system” that “many Christian moralists found his 
principles attractive and were able to set aside the irreligious elements in his writings” (Russell, Riddle 
of Hume’s Treatise, 245). So, Shaftesbury’s moral sense theory provides a naturalistic explanation of 
why people perceive moral qualities in the world. At the same time, it reinforces the rejection of a 
rationalistic account of morals by grounding them in sentience. Like Hume’s account, Shaftesbury’s 
gives sympathy a central role in moral motivation. His rejection of Hobbist egoism and reductionism 
21 
made Shaftesbury’s account more palatable to his Christian readers and colleagues, some of whom 
he heavily influenced.  
Francis Hutcheson was influenced by Shaftesbury, and in turn, Hutcheson influenced Hume. 
Hutcheson agreed with Hobbes and Shaftesbury that morals were sensed rather than reasoned out 
and that instinct rather than reason motivated moral conduct. Hutcheson writes, “the same Cause 
which determines us to pursue Happiness for ourselves, determines us both to Esteem and 
Benevolence on their proper Occasions” namely “the very Frame of our Nature, or a generous 
instinct” (Hutcheson in Selby-Bigge 92). Expanding upon Shaftesbury, Hutcheson asserts that “the 
Author of Nature has.... given us a Moral Sense, to direct our Actions, and to give us still nobler 
Pleasures.... We are not to imagine, that this moral Sense, more than the other Senses, supposes any 
innate Ideas, Knowledge, or Practical Proposition” (Hutcheson in Selby-Bigge 89). This position 
contrasts with Clarke’s, but it also ultimately grounds the moral sense in God rather than in the 
human organism, contrary to the positions of both Hobbes and Shaftesbury.  
Leaving out the religious dimension makes it hard to distinguish key differences between 
Hutcheson and Shaftesbury, as well as Hume’s relation to them; for instance, Hutcheson sees our 
moral sense as a gift from the “Author of Nature” and ultimately grounds sentience in divinity, 
where Shaftesbury makes no such move. In their own time, this was a difference that sparked 
controversy; Russell notes that “Shaftesbury’s reputation as an anti-Christian freethinker certainly 
posed problems for his more orthodox Scottish followers. This is especially apparent in the case of 
Hutcheson, who found it necessary to repudiate explicitly (i.e., in print) Shaftesbury’s ‘prejudices 
against Christianity’” (Russell, Riddle of Hume’s Treatise, 245).  
Hume noticed Hutcheson’s more religious approach and criticized him for it in a letter he 
wrote to Hutcheson in March 1740. In that letter, Hume raised a number of problems facing the 
attempt to ground sentimentalism in religion. There he indicates his belief that “our understanding 
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of human moral life leaves us without any relevant understanding of how we can relate to God as 
members of a shared moral community,” and as Russell notes, “It is a short step from this position 
to the conclusion that religious morality, insofar as it is based on language that we use to describe 
and interpret human moral life, is simply unintelligible” (Russell, Riddle of Hume’s Treatise, 260). 
Hutcheson found aspects of Shaftesbury disquieting but Hume prefers Shaftesbury’s naturalistic 
optimism to Hutcheson’s religiosity, as is evident in his analogical argument that, “The anatomist 
ought never to emulate the painter; nor in his accurate dissections and portraitures of the smaller 
parts of the human body, pretend to give his figures any graceful and engaging attitude or 
expression” (T 3.3.6.6). Hume explains that even if it displeases our religious or aesthetic sentiments, 
we should continue in our naturalistic inquiries in ethics. So, both for his predecessors, as well as 
Hume’s understanding of them, the presence or absence of irreligion was considered a crucial and 
substantive aspect of their position that was intimately related to their other philosophical and 
methodological commitments. It is important to note that the addition of this new religious 
dimension is meant to clarify Hume’s naturalism, distinguishing him from other naturalists of the 
day, rather than to stand as an alternative to naturalistic readings. For example, Hume’s relation to 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson shows that, for Hume’s contemporaries, their naturalism and 
empiricism were circumscribed by their views of religion. 
These insights motivate adding a religious dimension to our understanding of Hume’s 
dialectical situation, thereby enriching the exegetical framework through which we read Hume and 
his predecessors. The new framework treats irreligion as both a historically important and a 
philosophically substantive feature of positions in ethics, thereby adding depth to debates about 
early modern ethics. From this perspective “the moral sense school divides between thinkers such as 
Shaftesbury and those more like Hutcheson. Shaftesbury was careful to argue for the autonomy of 
morals and the possibility of virtuous atheism. Hutcheson expresses explicit discomfort about these 
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‘prejudices against Christianity’” (Russell, Riddle of Hume’s Treatise, 248). Russell explains that adding 
the religious dimension changes us from using the framework in figure 1.1 to that in figure 1.2. This 
provides a richer and more dynamic scheme for interpreting Hume’s arguments, and prima facie 
supports the methodological assumption that his positions in the Treatise are bound up with his 
positions on the Christian religion. 
     
Figure 1. The traditional framework       Figure 2. The irreligious framework  
for interpreting Hume's moral theory      for assessing Hume's moral theory  
 
 
 
Perhaps, at this point, one might respond that while these points are historically interesting 
and perhaps relevant to Hume’s work on religion, it seems a stretch to try and interpret the Treatise 
as an irreligious text. Such an interlocutor might point out that the subtitle of the work describes it 
as an “Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects,” leading 
the reader to understand it as a purely naturalistic or neo-Newtonian project. Such naturalist 
readings of Hume have dominated Hume scholarship since Norman Kemp Smith emphasized those 
aspects of Hume’s work. But many of the contemporaries of Hume discussed so far were self-styled 
Newtonians or Naturalists (Clarke for instance), yet provided accounts at odds with Hume’s. To 
take an example, a reader of Hume as a mere naturalist might argue that Hume’s reduction of moral 
norms to the passions they regulate is simply an applied case of his belief that “a few principles 
produce all that variety we observe in the universe,” and argue that this is what leads him to 
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characterize the passions in terms of self-regulation (T 3.1.2.6). But Hume expressly rejects taking 
this principle too far in accounting for moral practices when he criticizes the reduction of moral 
motivation to self-love, saying that such “fruitless” attempts “proceeded entirely, from that love of 
simplicity, which has been the source of much false reasoning in philosophy” (Hume, Moral 
Philosophy, 277). Hume indicates that simplicity cannot be one’s only methodological principle, and 
for Hume irreligion provides guidance when simplicity and natural method alone do not suffice. 
Furthermore, Hume famously undermined both the religious and the naturalistic ontologies of the 
day with his arguments about causation. In this sense, Hume’s irreligion helps us understand the 
limits of his naturalism as well as the topics he interrogates using that method. 
 The support for the irreligious reading extends beyond these points about method, and 
Hume leaves the reader a number of clues in the Treatise to discern the theologically subversive 
aspects of his position. The first clues are structural, some of them appearing in the title page and 
table of contents of the work. Paul Russell has identified a number of these pointing out that the 
“Treatise shares its title with a relevant and well-known work by Hobbes” and “the epigram of the 
title page... taken from Tacitus, also serves as the title of the final chapter of Spinoza’s Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus” two of the “most influential representatives of ‘atheistic’ or anti-Christian 
philosophy” (Russell, “‘Atheism’ and the Title Page of Hume's Treatise,” 408-423). In the content of 
the work, Hume adopts a number of positions that directly oppose Locke, Newton, and Clarke, for 
instance: anti-realism about causes, the immateriality of the soul, and the possibility of a vacuum. 
These anti-religious aspects were all recognized by the early readers and critics of the Treatise, one of 
whom noted that it “utterly demolished” the “Argument a Priori for the Existence of God” (cited in 
Russell, Riddle of Hume’s Treatise, 15-16). This was among a number of charges Hume responds to in 
his “Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh,” which included:  
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“Universal Scepticism,” “Principles leading to downright Atheism,” “Errors concerning the 
very Being and Existence of a God,” “Errors concerning God’s being the first Cause, and 
prime Mover of the Universe,” “denying the Immateriality of the Soul,” and “sapping the 
Foundations of Morality.” (Hume, Letter to Edinburgh, 115-116) 
This reveals that what appear to us as deeply hidden clues may have been more obvious to Hume’s 
contemporaries who shared his historical context.3 The structural and textual clues Hume leaves, 
taken alongside his reception as “atheistic,” provide support for the project of reading the Treatise as 
bound up with the religious debates of the day.  
Russell’s work supports the irreligious reading of the Treatise, but less than a fifth of his book 
on the subject (only one chapter) focuses on the sections of the Treatise dealing with morality. The 
relative rarity of moral theory in Russell’s book is problematic for two reasons. First, ideas about 
morality and society were clearly bound up in the Christianity of Hume’s time, making them prime 
targets for irreligious writers. Second, Russell distinguishes the irreligious reading by contrasting it 
with previous readings, which claimed that although he has occasional irreligious moments, Hume 
“never wrote on this topic in [a] systematic” way (Streminger 1989 277).4 Extending this reading to 
Hume’s moral theory further reveals the systematicity of Hume’s approach. Looking for the 
religious or irreligious aspects of Hume’s ethical theory makes sense if one appreciates Jerome 
Schneewind’s point that the ethical analogue to general theories in the sciences is not “philosophical 
theories of ethics” but “rather the general world outlook— typically a religious outlook, or a non-
religious world-view still conscious of its non-religiousness—in which a morality is embedded” 
(Schneewind 2010 11). Noticing Hume’s irreligious choices of passionate grounds for morality 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting here that Hume hoped to take Hutcheson’s chair of philosophy later in life but 
never got the job. Instead, it was given to Hume’s less irreligious colleague Adam Smith.  
4 See note 86 on Russell, Riddle of Hume’s Treatise, 384. 
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constitutes one more discovery in the excavation of irreligion from Hume’s writing on ethics. The 
grounding of justice in selfishness and modesty in pride appear as obviously irreligious moves once 
one considers that dimension. An understanding of the context Hume operated in, as well as his 
philosophical lineage, would make the absence of irreligious elements in and motivations for the 
Treatise a historical curiosity, and lends credence to the interpretation of Hume’s accounts of 
property and modesty I have provided. 
In the context of this broader, religiously charged debate, Hume’s explanations of property 
and modesty as grounded in pride and selfishness read as Hume’s attempt to follow Shaftesbury’s 
advice and “speak in parables, and with double meaning, that the enemy may be amused, and they 
only who have ears to hear may hear” (Shaftesbury, Characteristics, quoted in Russell, Riddle of Hume’s 
Treatise, 70). This interpretation is strengthened by the numerous clues Hume leaves throughout the 
Treatise alerting an attentive reader to his underlying intentions. Hume’s relationship to certain 
thinkers of the day lends support to the irreligious reading, given that such relationships are most 
clearly understood when Hume’s distinction as a naturalist and skeptic is enriched by the irreligious 
dimension of his rhetorical approach. My contribution to Russell’s argument helps extend it to cover 
more closely those portions of the Treatise dealing with ethics, further justifying the irreligious 
reading. There are substantive barriers to reading Hume either as an arch-sceptic or as a dogmatic 
Newtonian naturalist. I’ve suggested that irreligion can be seen as integral to understanding both of 
those aspects of Hume’s thought. Applying the irreligious lens helps us understand Hume better, but 
it also helps us to understand better the role of secularism in the birth of modern ethics. Hume tried 
to construct a moral theory that anticipated the coming death of God, but the void in our 
understanding of moral life left by God’s death is not so easily filled. Even if we today reject some 
of Hume’s secular and ultimately naturalistic accounts of knowledge and morality, the attempt to 
engage in such projects still grips us. We can be more historically self-aware if we realize that 
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Hume’s initiation of that project was rooted in a fundamental antagonism towards the Christianity 
of his day. 
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